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Corporate financial officers in the United States have traditionally  re- 
garded choices affecting their companies’ debt-equity structures as central 
to the management of the modern business enterprise, and they have also 
recognized the critical importance for these choices of the market environ- 
ment. The decision to issue new debt securities or new equity, and indeed 
the decision to raise external funds at all or to rely on internal equity addi- 
tions, are key ways in which individual business corporations respond to 
the incentives and signals provided by the financial markets. These incen- 
tives, and the responses they call forth, are basic aspects of how the finan- 
cial markets steer the allocation of the economy’s scarce saving. In a fun- 
damental sense, this process is a large part of why an economy like that of 
the United States has such highly developed capital markets in the first 
place. 
A major  new  factor affecting the U.S.  financial environment in the 
1980s is the need to finance federal government budget deficits far in ex- 
cess of any prior U.S. peacetime experience. Federal expenditures exceeded 
federal revenues by more than $100 billion for the first time during the re- 
cession year 1982, and the budget gap widened to nearly $200 billion, or 
6% of  the nation’s gross national product, as the business expansion be- 
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gan in 1983. The limited narrowing of the deficit to about $170 billion in 
1984, despite the continuing vigorous economic expansion, first repre- 
sented  the  emergence  of  unprecedentedly  large  deficits  on a  high- 
employment basis as well. Prospects for the remainder of the 1980s de- 
pend both on the economy’s further expansion and on future legislative 
action, of course, but a significant shrinking of the federal deficit before 
the end of the decade is problematic at best.’ 
Because of the central role of the market environment in affecting cor- 
porate financial decisions, this dramatic change in the stance of U.S. fis- 
cal policy bears potentially significant implications not only for market 
interest rates but also for corporate financing, and hence for the quantity 
and allocation of physical capital formation undertaken by the U.S.  busi- 
ness sector overall. In assessing these impacts, it is essential at the outset to 
judge the effects of  continuing large government deficits on the structure 
of interest rates and equity returns confronting individual business corpo- 
rations. That structure of  asset returns depends, in turn, on the portfolio 
behavior of investors who collectively must hold whatever securities cor- 
porations, the government, and other borrowers may issue. 
When investors are averse to bearing risk, as most investors plausibly 
are, their willingness to hold different kinds of  securities depends on their 
assessments of the respective risks to which holding these securities ex- 
poses them. Investors typically prefer assets that they expect to bear higher 
returns when the associated risks are equivalent, but excessive risk can 
lead investors to shun even assets that they expect to bear very large re- 
turns, Similarly, investors’ willingness to  treat some kinds of securities as 
substitutes for others in their portfolios depends on the relationships that 
investors perceive among the associated risks to holding these securities as 
well as others. If two assets expose holders to essentially the same set of 
risks-to  inflation, for example, or to the price of some raw commodity 
like oil or copper-investors  typically treat the two as close substitutes 
and allocate their portfolios accordingly. 
The object of the research summarized in this paper is to  determine, on 
the basis of  the plausible behavior of  investors in the U.S. financial mar- 
kets, how the emergence of continuing large federal government deficits at 
high employment is likely to affect the market environment for corporate 
financing. In particular, the specific question addressed here is how issues 
of either short- or long-term debt, to finance the government deficit, af- 
fect the structure of market returns on both debt and equity securities. Be- 
cause investors’ perceptions of  risks on these various assets are unobserv- 
1. Successive budget projections issued by the Office of Management and Budget and by 
the Congressional Budget Office differ; but most show that, in the absence of significant leg- 
islative action, the deficit will remain about 5% of  gross national product. 69  Implications of Government Deficits 
able, and hence must be indirectly inferred from data describing information 
that investors presumably have, the approach taken here is to examine the 
answers to this question generated by several different ways of represent- 
ing the all-important risk perceptions. 
Section 4.1 briefly reviews the relationship between investors’ demands 
for various assets and the respective risks that they associate with these as- 
sets. An aspect of this relationship that is of crucial importance in the con- 
text of the question addressed here is that not just the magnitude but even 
the direction of  the effect of government bond issues on debt and equity 
returns is an empirical question, not answerable on the basis of  theory 
alone. Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 present evidence on this question based 
on three different methods of inferring investors’ risk perceptions from 
available data. Section 4.5 summarizes the conclusions implied by these 
three forms of evidence and calls attention to several important caveats. 
To anticipate, the evidence presented here consistently indicates that fi- 
nancing government deficits by issuing short-term debt lowers the return 
on long-term debt, and lowers the return on equity by even more, in rela- 
tion to the benchmark of the return on short-term debt; and that issuing 
long-term debt raises the return on long-term debt, and lowers the return 
on equity, again in relation to the benchmark of the return on short-term 
debt. Hence either form of deficit financing alters the structure of returns 
so as to render equity a more attractive form of finance from the issuer’s 
perspective. This conclusion emerges from all three ways of  inferring in- 
vestors’ risk perceptions considered here. 
4.1  Government Debt Issues and Debt and Equity Returns 
In light of the radical change in U.S.  fiscal policy that occurred at the 
outset of the 1980s, it is important to know what effects the financing of 
government budget deficits has on the structure of asset returns. The U.S. 
government’s budget deficit has become unprecedentedly large-even  on 
a high-employment basis-in  comparison to the economy’s gross national 
product, to its supply of  private saving, and to the ordinary financing re- 
quirements of business corporations and households. In the absence of  a 
change from current tax and spending policies, this trend appears likely to 
continue. In addition, for the first time ever in U.S. peacetime experience, 
the federal government’s outstanding debt is rising, steadily and rapidly, 
in comparison to gross national product. This trend too appears likely to 
continue for some time. 
If these trends do continue, then the amount, and probably also the 
composition, of both business and household financing will be different 
in the 1980s than in previous cyclically comparable periods. From the per- 
spective of the balance of saving and investment, only a half-again in- 70  Benjamin M. Friedman 
crease in the economy’s net private saving rate would be sufficient to ac- 
commodate government deficits of the current magnitude plus the usual 
amount of private sector investment.2 Similarly, because the economy’s 
total of  government plus private sector debt outstanding has typically 
been a stable multiple of gross national product, a rising government debt 
ratio suggests that private sector borrowers will not be able to increase 
their outstanding debt in pace with economic growth.’ 
To what extent-indeed,  whether-government  deficit financing “crowds 
out” private financing, and hence private capital formation, depends in 
the first instance on how deficit financing affects the market returns on 
private ~ecurities.~  Neither corporations nor individuals voluntarily bor- 
row less, or issue fewer equities (or retain less earnings), out of any innate 
desire to make the national accounts balance. Instead, private financing 
decisions depend on incentives and disincentives provided by market re- 
turns. Lower required rates of return (higher securities prices) presumably 
encourage borrowers and equity issuers, but higher required returns (lower 
securities prices) discourage private financing. Changes in the structure of 
relative returns-for  example, between debt and equity-  provide incen- 
tives to issue more of one kind of security and less of another. 
How market returns respond to such developments as issues of govern- 
ment debt depends, in turn, on how investors perceive the risks associated 
with different kinds of securities. For any given set of risk assessments 
that market participants hold-including  not just the riskiness of each as- 
set individually but, importantly, the set of relationships connecting the 
risk on any one asset to that on any other-investors  choose what assets to 
hold on the basis of the respective returns they expect various assets to 
bear. One pattern of expected returns will lead investors to allocate their 
portfolios in one way, while an alternative pattern of expected returns will 
lead them to choose a different allocation. No one investor ever holds all 
of the various assets available in the market, of course, but collectively all 
investors together must allocate their aggregate portfolio in just the com- 
position corresponding to the assets outstanding in the market as a whole. 
2. The U.S. economy’s net private saving rate has been roughly steady at about 7% of 
gross national product for decades. (Thus far during the 1980s it has averaged less than 6%, 
but this decline was probably a result of the 1981-82 business recession.) The federal govern- 
ment deficit averaged less than 1  Yo  of gross national product in the 1950s and 1960s and less 
than 2% in the 1970s. 
3. See Friedman (1982) for a discussion of the long-run behavior of the U.S. economy’s 
debt-income ratio. The typical value for this ratio is about 1.45. The ratio normally rises 
modestly during recession, but the increase during 1981-82 was larger than usual. What has 
been even more unusual about the most recent business cycle is that the ratio did not promptly 
decline toward 1.45 during the recovery, and the ratio still remained above 1.60 at midyear 
1985. As of the time of writing, it is too soon to determine whether this atypical debt issuing 
behavior represents a lasting break from prior experience. 
4. For a formal presentation of the ideas at issue here, see Friedman (1978). The discussion 
both there and here is much in the spirit of Tobin (1961, 1969). 71  Implications of Government Deficits 
Under most circumstances, only one unique pattern of expected returns 
will lead all investors collectively to choose exactly that allocation of their 
aggregate portfolio. 
When the composition of the assets outstanding in the market changes, 
therefore, the pattern of expected asset returns must change also, shifting 
to whatever configuration will induce investors collectively to hold exactly 
this new composition of assets. In this way, changes in the composition of 
assets outstanding-for  example, as a result of government deficit financ- 
ing-bring  about changes in the market-clearing structure of expected as- 
set returns. Moreover, because the economic function of these changes in 
expected returns is to induce investors to change their portfolio alloca- 
tions, and because investors’ demands for different assets depend on their 
perception of the associated risks, what changes in expected returns fol- 
low from any specific change in the composition of outstanding assets 
also depends on investors’ risk perceptions. 
Under most circumstances, increasing the market supply of any specific 
asset raises that asset’s market-clearing expected ret~rn.~  If expected re- 
turns did not change at all, investors would have to hold “too much” of 
the asset with increased supply. Their efforts to “trade out of” that asset 
depress its price and raise its subsequent expected return. 
By contrast, an increase in the supply of any one asset may either raise 
or lower the expected return on any other asset. As that one asset’s expected 
return rises, the expected returns on assets that investors regard as close 
substitutes for it-for  example, government debt and high-grade corpo- 
rate debt of comparable maturity-will  rise in step. If investors are trying 
to trade out of the asset with increased supply, however, they must be try- 
ing to trade into something else, presumably assets that they do not regard 
as close substitutes for the asset with increased supply. Investors’ efforts 
to trade into such other assets bid up their respective prices, so that their 
respective expected returns fall rather than rise. 
This distinction, based on whether investors regard different securities 
as close or distant substitutes, and hence based on the risks that investors 
associate with holding different assets, is crucial to the question whether 
government  deficit  financing “crowds  out” private  capital  formation. 
Forcing investors collectively to absorb into their aggregate portfolio an 
increased supply of government debt presumably raises the market-clearing 
expected return on government debt and on closely similar corporate debt 
instruments. Whether it raises or lowers the expected return on equity, or 
the expected return on dissimilar debt instruments, depends on the rela- 
tive substitutabilities among debt, equity, and other classes of assets in in- 
vestors’ portfolios. 
5.  It necessarily does so when all assets are (imperfect) substitutes in investors’ portfolios, 
and for plausible values of the relevant parameters it may do so even when some assets are 
complements. 72  Benjamin M.  Friedman 
If government deficit financing raises the expected returns on both debt 
and equity, its economic effect is  to reduce incentives for corporate fi- 
nancing in any form (unless, of course, the additional government spend- 
ing or reduced taxes increase expected profits, as would be expected when 
the economy’s resources are less than fully employed). In this case deficit 
financing would indeed crowd out corporate capital formation and would 
have uncertain  effects on the composition  of the  remaining (smaller) 
amount of corporate financing. 
Alternatively, if government deficit financing raises the expected return 
on debt but lowers the expected return on equity, it changes the incentives 
for corporate financing in importantly different ways.  In this case, the 
deficit financing would give corporations a clear incentive to substitute 
equity financing (including retentions)  for debt  financing. Whether  it 
would crowd out or “crowd in” overall corporate financing, and hence 
overall corporate capital formation, depends on the relative magnitudes 
of the induced movements in debt and equity returns, as well as on the rel- 
ative shares of debt and equity in the resulting overall corporate financing 
package. 
The evidence examined here,  based  on the relative substitutabilities 
among short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity that follow from these 
three assets’ respective risk properties, cannot by itself answer the ques- 
tion to what extent do the returns on all assets together rise in response to 
government  deficit  financing.  Such  movements of  the  overall  return 
structure depend not only on relative asset substitutabilities but also on 
monetary policy, which lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
The evidence examined here does show how the returns on specific as- 
sets move in relation to one another, however. In particular, the evidence 
presented in sections 4.2,  4.3, and 4.4 below consistently indicates that 
government deficit financing lowers the expected return on equity in com- 
parison to the expected return on either short- or long-term debt. More- 
over, this relative reduction of the equity return consistently emerges re- 
gardless of whether the government finances its deficit by issuing short- or 
long-term debt. 
4.2  Evidence Based on Simple Inspection of  Returns6 
Individual investors, either on their own or through intermediaries, are 
the ultimate holders of the great majority of all corporate and government 
securities issued in the United States. Table 4.1 indicates the composition 
of the aggregate portfolio of financial assets held directly by U.S.  house- 
holds, as of year-end 1980, arranged according to three major asset classes 
6. See Friedrnan (1985)  for the details of  the specific procedures underlying the results 
summarized in this section. 73  Implications of Government Deficits 
Table 4.1 
Asset Class  1980:IV Value 
Three-Cbu Disaggregation of  Household Sector Fin~dd  Asseta 
464.3 
Short-term debt (S):  $1,777.0 
Money  268.0 
Regulated-return  time and saving deposits  624.7 
Competitive-return  time deposits  669.7 
Money market fund shares  74.4 
U.S. government securities  102.0 
Open market paper  38.2 
U.S. government securities  180.2 
State and local government obligations  74.2 
Corporate and foreign bonds  86.9 
Mortgages  122.5 
Mutual fund shares  63.7 
Directly held equity shares  1,151.8 
Long-term debt (L): 
Equity (E):  1,215.6 
Total  $3,456.9 
Notes:  Values in billions of dollars. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Detail may not add to total because of rounding. 
that differ from one another according to the risks associated with hold- 
ing them. Short-term debt includes all assets bearing real returns that are 
risky, over a single year or calendar quarter, only because of uncertainty 
about inflation. By contrast, long-term debt is risky because of uncertainty 
not only about inflation but also about changes in asset prices directly re- 
flecting changes in market interest rates. Similarly, equity is risky because 
of uncertainty about inflation and about changes in stock prices. 
The first column of table 4.2 shows the per annum mean nominal return 
borne by each of these three classes of  assets during 1960-80,  including 
percentage capital gains or losses on both long-term debt and equity.’ 
After allowance for what proved to be capital losses on average, over two 
decades in which interest rate levels typically were rising, the return on 
long-term debt differed only trivially from that on short-term debt despite 
a typically upward-sloping yield curve. As is familiar, the return on equity 
was substantially greater than on either maturity of debt. 
The returns that investors ultimately care about, however, are not these 
observed nominal returns but the corresponding returns after both infla- 
7. The nominal returns associated with these real returns are zero for money; a weighted 
average yield for time and savings deposits; the 4-6-month prime commercial paper yield for 
other short-term debt; the Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield, plus annualized percentage 
capital gains or losses inferred by applying the consol pricing formula to changes in the Baa 
yield, for long-term debt; and the dividend-price yield, plus annualized percentage capital 
gains or losses on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, for equity. 74  Beniarnin M. Friedman 
Table 4.2  Mean Returns on Financial Assets, 1960-80 
Historical Means  Forecast Mean 
Nominal  Real  Real  Real 
Before-Tax  Before-Tax  After-Tax  After-Tax 
Return (%)  Return (%)  Return (7%)  Return (%) 
Short-term debt (r0  3.81  ~  1.62  -  2.80  -  2.40 
Long-term debt (rr)  3.83  -  1.60  -  3.83  -  4.40 
Equity (rd  10.64  5.21  3.13  3.73 
Note: Values in percent per annum. 
tion and taxes. The second column of table 4.2 shows the mean real re- 
turns on these three assets, calculated in each case by simply subtracting 
the per annum change in the consumer price index. Only equity bore a 
positive real return on average during these years. The third column of the 
table shows the corresponding mean after-tax real return on each asset, 
calculated by applying the household sector’s average effective marginal 
tax rates in each year for interest, dividends, and capital gains to the re- 
spective nominal components of the before-tax returns.8  Only equity bore 
a positive real after-tax return on average during this period. Moreover, 
because of the differential tax rates applicable to interest payments and 
capital gains (which, for bonds, were capital losses on average), the mean 
after-tax real return on long-term  debt was about 1Vo  per annum more 
negative than that on short-term debt. 
The crucial aspect of these returns that determines the effect of govern- 
ment deficit financing is the set of risks investors associate with holding 
various assets. These perceptions presumably bear at least some relation- 
ship to the actual experience of asset returns over time. The heavy solid 
lines in the three panels of  figure 4.1 plot the quarter-by-quarter experi- 
ence of  the annualized after-tax real returns on these three broad classes 
of assets during 1960-80.  Because of  the greater volatility of  long-term 
debt and especially equity returns, the three panels are drawn with differ- 
ent scales. 
The return on short-term debt, plotted in the top panel of the figure, ex- 
perienced some volatility over this period, but its chief characteristic was a 
general downward trend after the mid-1960s due to  the taxation of nomi- 
nal rather than real interest payments. The return on long-term debt, plot- 
ted in the middle panel, experienced much more volatility, together with a 
modest overall downward trend. The major bond market swings during 
8. The marginal tax rates applied to interest and dividends are values estimated by Estrella 
and Fuhrer (1983), on the basis of Internal Revenue Service data, to reflect the marginal tax 
bracket of the average recipient of these two respective kinds of income in each year. The 
marginal tax rate applied to capital gains is an analogous estimate, including allowances for 
deferral and loss offset features, due to Feldstein et al. (1983). 75  Implications of Government Deficits 
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this period,  including the “credit crunches” and subsequent rallies in 
1966,  1970, and 1974, the reaction to the Federal Reserve System’s new 
monetary policy procedures in 1979, and the imposition of  credit controls 
in  1980, are readily visible. The return on equity, plotted in the bottom 
panel, experienced still more volatility and again a modest downward 
trend. The period’s major stock market swings are also readily visible, in- 
cluding the crash in  1962, the response to the  1966 and  1970 “credit 
crunches,”  and  especially the  response  to the combination  of  credit 
crunch and OPEC in 1974. 
Even a casual inspection of figure 4.1 indicates that the returns on these 
three broad classes of  assets tend to move together over time, and it is 
plausible that investors are aware of these comovements in at least some 
respects. The upper panel of table 4.3 shows the actual variances and co- 
Actual returns and regression-based forecasts, 1960-80 76  Benjamin M. Friedman 






161.77  597.86 
Effects of  Government Deficit Financing (per $100 Billion) 
Short-Term Debt (%)  Long-Term Debt (%) 
~~ 
Effect on (rL -  rs) 
Effect on (rE -  rs) 
Effect on (rE  -  rL) 
-  .17 
-  .63 
-  .46 
.22 
-  .35 
-  .57 
variances among these three returns, on the same quarter-by-quarter basis 
plotted in figure 4.1. The variance of 11.18 shown for the return on short- 
term debt, for example, means that approximately two-thirds of the time 
this return was within k  3.34% (the square root of 11.18) of the -  2.80% 
mean shown in table 4.2. The corresponding two-thirds probability ranges 
for the more volatile returns on long-term debt and equity are -  3.18% 
f  14.47% and 3.13% k  24.45%, respectively. The three off-diagonal ele- 
ments in this panel of the table give the analogous pairwise covariances 
among the three assets. 
For a given structure of variances and covariances describing investors' 
perceptions of asset return risks, it is straightforward to derive from the 
standard theory of risk-averse portfolio selection how investors' asset de- 
mands respond  to movements in expected asset returns, and therefore 
how the pattern of expected returns must change in response to a change 
in the market composition of assets that investors collectively must 
The lower panel of table 4.3 summarizes the effects of government deficit 
financing, on the specific assumption that the variances and covariances 
reported above, simply calculated from the observed experience of asset 
returns during 1960-80, describe investors' risk perceptions. Because the 
effects of government deficit financing depend on what kind of  securities 
the Treasury issues,'O the table reports separate sets of effects following 
from changes in the respective supplies of short- and long-term debt. 
9. The specific assumption made throughout this paper is that investors' behavior exhibits 
constant relative risk aversion, with value equal to four. Bodie et al. (1985) also assumed con- 
stant relative risk aversion equal to four. This value is about in the middle of the range of 
available empirical estimates. (Friend and Blume [1975] suggested a value in excess of two, 
Grossman and Shiller [I9811 suggested four, and Friend and Hasbrouck [1982] suggested 
six.) See Friedman (1985) for details of the calculations. 
10. More precisely, the effects depend on issues by the Treasury less net purchases by the 
Federal Reserve System. 77  Implications of Government Deficits 
If the Treasury finances a deficit by issuing short-term debt, the expected 
return on short-term debt presumably rises in comparison to  the expected 
returns on other assets.” Put the other way around, in this case the expected 
returns on other assets fall in comparison to that on short-term debt. 
Which other assets’ returns fall by more and which by less depends on the 
relative asset substitutabilities that depend, in turn, on investors’ risk per- 
ceptions. The results shown in table 4.3 indicate that the expected differ- 
ential between the returns on long- and short-term debt (which is presum- 
ably positive on the basis of  past experience) narrows by .17%, while the 
expected differential between the returns on equity and short-term debt 
(also presumably positive) narrows by.63%, in response to each $100 bil- 
lion additional supply of  short-term government debt to be held in inves- 
tors’ aggregate portfolio. In other words, if  the short-term debt return is 
held fixed by monetary policy, the expected returns on long-term debt and 
equity fall by .17%  and .63%, respectively. The expected differential be- 
tween the returns on equity and long-term debt (also presumably positive) 
therefore narrows by .46%. For a $200 billion deficit, the effects are exactly 
double these magnitudes. 
Similarly, if  the Treasury finances a deficit by issuing long-term debt, 
the expected return on long-term debt presumably rises in comparison to 
the expected returns on other assets. If the short-term debt return is fixed, 
the long-term debt return then rises absolutely and the returns on other as- 
sets may either rise or fall. Which other assets’ returns rise and which fall 
again depends on relative asset substitutabilities, and hence on investors’ 
perceptions of risk. The results shown in table 4.3 indicate that the differ- 
ential between the returns on long- and short-term debt widens by .22%, 
while the expected differential between the returns on equity and short- 
term debt narrows by .35%,  in response to each $100 billion additional 
supply of long-term debt. In other words, if the return on short-term debt 
is fixed, the expected return on long-term debt rises by .22% and the ex- 
pected return on equity falls by .35%. The expected differential between 
the returns on equity and long-term debt therefore again narrows, in this 
case by 57%. Once again, for a $200 billion deficit the effects would be 
twice as large. 
The finding that financing the government deficit by  either short- or 
long-term debt lowers the expected return on equity, in comparison to the 
expected returns on both classes of debt instruments, bears potentially im- 
portant implications for corporate financing. Nevertheless, these estimated 
effects directly depend on the assumed underlying variance-covariance 
structure, and simply using the observed historical pattern of asset return 
movements to represent investors’ perceptions presumably overstates the 
amount of uncertainty investors actually attach to their expectations of 
11. See again the discussion in sec. 4.1, esp. n.  5. 78  Benjamin M. Friedman 
uncertain asset returns. Although the emphasis here is on the direction 
rather than the magnitude of the effects of government deficit financing, 
incorrectly represented risk perceptions may lead not just to incorrect esti- 
mated  magnitudes  but to incorrect inferences about direction as well. 
Some more satisfactory representation  of investors’ risk perceptions is 
clearly needed. 
4.3  Evidence Based on Continually Updated Forecasting Regressions” 
The simple procedure used in section 4.2 to represent  investors’ risk 
perceptions suffers from attributing to investors both too little informa- 
tion and, for some applications, too much. As long as the object of the 
analysis is to describe investors’ behavior at any time after year-end 1980, 
it is satisfactory to  assume that investors know the actual experience of as- 
set return means, variances, and covariances during 1960-80.  By contrast, 
if the goal is to  describe investors’ behavior on average during this period, 
then the procedure used in section 4.2 attributes to  investors information 
which they did not  have at the outset  but gradually acquired as time 
passed. 
This procedure also attributes too little information to  investors by dis- 
regarding their knowledge, at each point in time, of the most recent real- 
izations of  security returns and the principal determinants of  these re- 
turns. During the 1960-80 period the after-tax real returns on all three 
classes of  assets considered here exhibited substantial serial correlation 
because the underlying movements of inflation, interest rates, and stock 
prices were themselves serially correlated.  l3 When returns are serially cor- 
related over time, information about the most recent actual values is a 
useful ingredient in forming expectations about returns in the immediate 
future. Ignoring that information can lead to excessively large estimates 
of the uncertainty surrounding these expectations, as is  apparently the 
problem with the results presented in table 4.3. Table 4.4 presents a set of 
analogous results based on a procedure that takes much more careful ac- 
count of  what information investors did and did not have at any particu- 
lar time. 
As of  the beginning  of each calendar quarter, investors presumably 
know the stated interest rates on short-term debt instruments, the current 
prices and the coupon rates on long-term debt instruments, the current 
prices and (approximately) the dividends on equities, and the relevant tax 
rates. The three uncertain elements that they must forecast over the com- 
12. See Friedman (1984) for the details of the specific procedures underlying the results 
summarized in this section. 
13. The first-order serial correlation coefficients are .86 for the short-term debt return, 31 
for the long-term debt return, and .33 for the equity return. Corresponding coefficients for 
inflation, bond capital gains, and equity capital gains are .90,  .44,  and .31, respectively. 79  Implications of Government Deficits 






48.09  317.27 
Effects of Government Deficit Financing (per $100 Billion) 
Short-Term  Debt (%)  Long-Term Debt (%) 
Effect on  (rL - rs) 
Effect on (rE - rs) 
Effect on (rE - rL) 
-  .06 
-  .33 
-  .27 
.10 
-  .24 
-  .34 
ing quarter, in order to form expectations of the after-tax real returns on 
the three broad classes of  assets considered here, are inflation, the capital 
gain or loss due to changing bond prices, and the capital gain or loss due 
to changing stock prices. 
The procedure underlying the results reported in table 4.4 represents in- 
vestors as forming expectations of  these three uncertain return elements, 
at each point in time, by estimating a linear regression model relating each 
element to past values of itself and the other two, using all data observed 
through the immediately preceding period. In addition to providing fore- 
cast values of the three uncertain elements for the period ahead, the linear 
regression model at each point in time also directly indicates the variances 
and covariances associated with the forecasts derived in this way.  After 
each period elapses, investors can then repeat the same procedure, incor- 
porating the one new observation on inflation and on long-term debt and 
equity capital gains into the data used to reestimate the linear regression 
model to make forecasts for the next period. 
Given the simple arithmetic connection between asset returns and these 
underlying uncertain elements, and given investors’ presumed knowledge 
of the other elements comprising returns, these 1  -period-ahead forecasts 
of inflation and the respective capital gains on long-term debt and equity 
directly imply 1-period-ahead forecasts of the after-tax real returns on all 
three classes of assets at each point in time. Similarly, the variances and 
covariances associated with the forecasts of inflation and the two capital 
gains directly imply the variances and covariances associated with the cor- 
responding forecasts of the three asset returns. The key advantage of re- 
presenting investors’ expectations in this way,  in contrast to the simple 
procedure used in section 4.2, lies in focusing strictly on information that 
investors actually had at each point in time and in making a not implausi- 
ble assumption about how they might have used it. 80  Benjamin M. Friedman 
The heavy solid lines in the three panels of figure 4.2 show the quarter- 
by-quarter movements, during 1960-80, of the per annum rates of infla- 
tion, capital gains on long-term debt, and capital gains on equity. (As in 
fig. 4.1, the scales differ.) The corresponding broken lines plot the succes- 
sive 1  -period-ahead forecasts generated by this continually updated linear 
regression procedure,  for each quarter during this 21-year period.  For 
1960:I the three forecasts are based on the linear regression model relating 
each uncertain element to a constant term, four lagged values of  itself, 
and four lagged values of each of  the other two uncertain elements, esti- 
mated using data for 1953:11-1959:IV.  For 1960:II the procedure is the 
same except that the data used to estimate the linear regression model cover 
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Fig. 4.2  Actual elements of  returns and regression-based forecasts, 
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1953:11-1960:1.  The procedure is analogous for subsequent periods, end- 
ing with the use of data for 1953:II-l98O:III  to generate the l-period- 
ahead forecasts for 1980:IV. 
The degree of success achieved by these l-period-ahead forecasts natu- 
rally varies according to the extent of the serial correlation in the series be- 
ing forecast. The simple correlation between the actual outcomes and the 
corresponding forecasts derived in this way is  -88 for inflation,  .42 for 
long-term debt capital gains, and .23 for equity capital gains. As is clear 
from the figure, this inherently backward-looking forecast procedure en- 
joys the advantages, and suffers the shortcomings, of expecting the imme- 
diate future to be like the immediate past. 
The broken lines in the three panels of figure 4.1 plot the successive 1- 
period-ahead forecasts of the three after-tax real returns corresponding to 
these  forecasts  of  the  underlying  uncertain  elements. Here,  too,  the 
backward-looking procedure represents the immediate future as resem- 
bling the immediate past, so that the success achieved by the forecasts var- 
ies according to the serial correlation in the different asset returns. The 
simple correlation between the actual returns and the corresponding fore- 
casts is .83 for short-term debt, 31  for long-term debt, and .30 for equi- 
ties. The final column of  table 4.2 shows the 1960-80 means of these 1- 
period-ahead  forecasts of the three after-tax  real returns.  Comparison 
with the actual means shown in the immediately preceding column indi- 
cates that, on average,  these forecasts  were  somewhat too optimistic 
about the returns on short-term debt and equity and somewhat too pessi- 
mistic about the return on long-term debt. 
The upper panel of table 4.4 shows the variances and covariances asso- 
ciated with these three asset return forecasts, on average for 1960-80.'* 
These values are much smaller than those shown in table 4.3, indicating 
the importance of investors' having (and using) information about recent 
actual returns. The two-thirds probability ranges for the three after-tax 
real returns are  .+ 1.12% for short-term debt,  f  8.75%  for long-term 
debt, and f  17.81% for equity. 
The lower panel of  table 4.4 shows the implied effects of government 
deficit financing that follow from assuming that the variances and covar- 
iances shown above represent investors' perceptions of the risks associated 
with the respective returns on these three broad classes of assets. As is to 
be expected, the smaller uncertainty than in table 4.3 makes investors 
more readily willing to reallocate their portfolios in response to any given 
movement of  expected asset returns, and therefore reduces (in absolute 
value) the movement of returns needed to induce investors collectively to 
accommodate a given change in the composition of assets to be held. Even 
14. The values shown are the simple means of  the variances and covariances for each of 
the 84 quarters. 82  Benjamin M. Friedman 
so, the estimated effects are hardly negligible. For example, for the ex- 
pected differential between the returns on equity and long-term debt, the 
difference between a $200 billion deficit and a balanced budget is .54% 
under short-term financing and .68% under long-term financing. 
In each case the direction of  the implied effect shown in table 4.4 is 
identical to that shown in table 4.3. Financing government deficits by is- 
suing short-term debt lowers the return on long-term debt, and lowers the 
return on equity by even more, in comparison to the return on short-term 
debt. Financing deficits by  issuing long-term debt raises the return on 
long-term debt and lowers the return on equity, again in comparison to the 
return on short-term debt. Under either form of deficit financing, there- 
fore, the return on equity falls in comparison to the return on debt securi- 
ties of either maturity. 
4.4  Implications of Survey Expectations 
Because the risk perceptions that determine the effects of  government 
deficit financing are inherently unobservable, so that any procedure for 
representing them is necessarily only tentative, it makes sense to  examine 
the implications of  several different representations rather than rely on 
only one. Opinion surveys provide a further source of information about 
what investors thought at specific times in the past. Although the avail- 
able surveys typically just ask respondents to forecast specific economic 
variables, without also asking for them to state the uncertainty that they 
associate with their forecasts, it is nevertheless possible to use survey ex- 
pectations to  infer perceptions of uncertainty in a variety of ways. 
The upper panel of table 4.5 summarizes the forecasting performance 
of the Livingston survey of inflation and stock price expectations, and the 
Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  of  long-term  interest  rate  expectations,  by 
Thble 4.5  Mean Survey Expectations, EhXkIV-198o:IV 
Expected Asset Return Components 
_______~ 
Historical Mean (%)  Survey Mean (%) 
Idation  7.94  5.87 
Aaa bond yield  8.95  8.74 
SLP  stock price index  98.77  108.14 
Implied Expected Real After-Tax Returns 
Historical Mean (%)  Survey Mean (%) 
Short-term debt (rs)  -  4.86  -2.78 
Long-term debt (rL)  -  1.97  4.03 
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showing  the  survey  means  and  the corresponding  actual  means  for 
1969:IV-l98O:IV.  Is  On average,  the Livingston  respondents  underpre- 
dicted  inflation  and overpredicted  stock prices  by  substantial margins, 
while the Goldsmith-Nagan  respondents only modestly  underpredicted 
the long-term interest rate. Figure 4.3 shows these actual outcomes (heavy 
solid lines) and the corresponding survey expectations (broken lines) for 
each quarter during this period. Especially for the long-term interest rate, 
but to some extent for inflation and stock prices as well, survey respon- 
dents typically did forecast the immediate future as if it would resemble 
15. The first Goldsmith-Nagan survey took place in September 1969. The Livingston data 
are available for a much longer period.  I  am grateful to Peter Nagan for providing his un- 
published data for use in this and other research. 84  Benjamin M. Fkiedman 
the immediate past. The resulting simple correlation between the actual 
values and the corresponding survey expectations is .74  for inflation, .84 
for the long-term interest rate, and .50  for stock prices. 
The lower panel of  table 4.5 shows the 1969:IV-l98O:IV  means of the 
actual after-tax real returns on the three classes of assets considered here, 
and the means of the corresponding expected returns calculated on  the ba- 
sis of the Livingston survey expectation of  inflation, the long-term debt 
capital gain or loss implied by the Goldsmith-Nagan survey expectation of 
the long-term interest rate, and the equity capital gain (never a loss) im- 
plied by the Livingston survey expectation of  stock prices.I6 The average 
underprediction of inflation implies too optimistic an average expectation 
of the return to  short-term debt. The average underprediction of both in- 
flation and the long-term interest rate implies an average expectation of 
the long-term debt return that is too optimistic by a wider margin. The 
average underprediction of  inflation and especially the average overpre- 
diction of stock prices implies an average expectation of the equity return 
that is too optimistic by a still wider margin. 
Figure 4.4 shows the actual outcomes (heavy solid lines) and corre- 
sponding survey-based expectations (broken lines) of these three after-tax 
real returns, for each quarter during 1969:IV-1980:IV.17  Here it is inter- 
esting that, for each return, the survey-based expectation is a less success- 
ful predictor than the regression-based forecasts examined in section 4.3. 
The simple correlation between the actual values and the corresponding 
survey-based expectations is .62  for the short-term debt return, .26  for the 
long-term debt return, and -.  13  (that is, an inverse relationship) for the eq- 
uity return. 
The upper panel of table 4.6 shows the variances and covariances of the 
errors  associated  with  these  survey-based  expectations  over  1969:IV- 
1980:IV.  As comparison to tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows, the variance associated 
with the return on short-term debt here is smaller than that implied by the 
simple inspection procedure used in section 4.2,  but larger than that im- 
plied by the regression procedure in section 4.3. The two-thirds probabil- 
ity range for the short-term debt return is  +_2.49%.  By contrast, the re- 
spective  variances  associated  with  the returns  on long-term  debt and 
equity are larger than the corresponding variances implied by either the 
simple inspection procedure or the regression procedure. The two-thirds 
16. Once again, as of the beginning of  each period investors presumably know the stated 
interest rates on short-term debt instruments, the current prices and coupons on long-term 
debt instruments, and the current prices and dividends on equity. For short-term debt and 
equity, the actual returns here are the same as those analyzed in secs. 4.2 and 4.3. For long- 
term debt the return is based on the Aaa utility rate used in the Goldsmith-Nagan survey, 
rather than on the Baa corporate rate as in secs. 4.2 and 4.3. 
17. It is necessary to interpolate quarterly values of  the inflation and stock price expecta- 
tions because the Livingston survey asks for 6-month-ahead expectations twice per year. 
(The Goldsmith-Nagan survey asks for 3-month-ahead expectations four times per year.) 85  Implications of Government Deficits 
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Fig. 4.4  Actual returns and survey-based forecasts, 1969-80 
probability ranges are k  32.80% and k  36.50% for the long-term debt re- 
turn and the equity return, respectively.'* Asset returns were more volatile 
on average during the 1970s than they were during the 1960s (and hence, 
on average, during 1960-80), but the major part of the explanation for the 
larger variances shown in table 4.6 is the weaker correlations between the 
survey expectations and the corresponding actual outcomes.  l9 
18.  The error variance for  the return on  long-term debt is dominated by the sharp drop in 
the Aaa (new issue) rate when credit controls were imposed in 1980:II. (The Baa seasoned 
rate, used in secs. 4.2 and 4.3,  fell only slightly in 1980:II.) For the 1969:IV-I980:1V  period 
omitting this one quarter, the corresponding error variance is 687.52. 
19.  The variances for 1969:IV-l98O:IV,  computed as in table 4.3,  are (from upper left to 
lower right) 9.82,293.90,  and 763.33.  The corresponding variances computed as in table 4.4 
are 1.54.89.97,  and 353.64. 86  Benjamin M. Friedman 
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Effects of Government Deficit Financing (per $100 billion) 
Short-Term Debt (%)  Long-Term Debt (%) 
Effect on  (rL  -  rs)  -  .40  1.62 
Effect on  (rE  -  rs)  -  .56  -  .63 
Effect on (re -  rL)  -  .16  -  2.25 
The lower panel of table 4.6 shows the implied effects of government 
deficit financing that follow from assuming that the error variances and 
covariances of the survey-based expectations represent investors’ percep- 
tions of the risks associated with the respective returns on these three 
classes of assets.20  These large variances and covariances imply effects on 
expected returns that are much larger (in absolute value) than those re- 
ported in tables 4.3  and 4.4-indeed,  perhaps too large to be  entirely 
credible. Once again, however, the implied direction of these effects is in 
each case identical to that reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4. Financing gov- 
ernment deficits by issuing short-term debt lowers the return on long-term 
debt, and lowers the return on equity by even more, in comparison to the 
return on short-term debt. Financing deficits by issuing long-term debt 
raises the return on long-term debt, and lowers the return on equity, again 
in comparison to the return on short-term debt. In both cases the return 
on  equity falls in comparison to the return on either maturity of debt. 
4.5  Conclusions and Caveats 
How the financing of government budget deficits affects the structure 
of  expected asset returns depends on assets’ relative substitutabilities in 
investors’ aggregate portfolio, and these substitutabilities in turn depend 
on how investors perceive the risks associated with the respective asset re- 
turns. Increasing the supply that investors collectively must hold of any 
asset raises that asset’s market-clearing expected return. By  contrast, an 
20. An alternative use of these survey data in this context would be to use each period’s dis- 
persion of  individual  survey responses to proxy that period’s uncertainty. The potential 
shortcomings of  assuming a relationship between dispersion among different individuals’ 
point  estimates and the  uncertainty  perceived by  the  representative individual  are well 
known, however. 87  Implications of Government Deficits 
increase in the supply of any one asset may either raise or lower the expected 
return on any other asset. 
The empirical results reported in this paper, based on three different 
ways of representing investors’ risk perceptions, consistently indicate that 
government deficit financing raises expected debt returns relative to ex- 
pected equity returns, regardless of the maturity of the government’s fi- 
nancing.  More  specifically,  financing government  deficits  by  issuing 
short-term debt lowers the return on long-term debt, and lowers the re- 
turn on equity by even more, relative to the return on short-term debt. Fi- 
nancing deficits by issuing long-term debt raises the return on long-term 
debt, but lowers the return on equity, again in comparison to  the return on 
short-term debt. The indicated magnitudes of these effects differ accord- 
ing to the method used to represent investors’ risk perceptions, but the 
qualitative results are consistent throughout. Moreover, many of the indi- 
cated magnitudes are large enough to matter economically.21 
These results imply that continuing large government deficits at full em- 
ployment lead to market incentives for individual business corporations 
to emphasize reliance on equity (including retentions), and reduce reliance 
on debt, in comparison with the composition of corporate financing that 
would prevail in the absence of the need to finance the government budget 
deficit.  Because these results describe effects only on relative returns, 
rather than effects on absolute levels of  returns, they answer questions 
about the composition of corporate financing but not about its total. Nev- 
ertheless, in conjunction with  some further assumption to anchor the 
overall return structure-for  example, that monetary policy accommo- 
dates the deficit so as to keep expected short-term real returns unchanged, 
or, alternatively, that monetary policy is not accommodative and hence 
lets expected short-term real returns rise if  the deficit is large enough- 
these results also bear straightforward implications for the volume of cor- 
porate financing and, in turn, for corporate capital formation. 
Finally, at least three caveats are potentially important in evaluating 
these results. First, as the discussion throughout this paper has repeatedly 
emphasized, investors’ perceptions of  asset risk are not directly observ- 
able. It is therefore necessary to use some operational procedure to repre- 
sent them. It is significant that qualitatively identical results follow from 
each of  the three quite different procedures used for this purpose here. 
Even so, no data-based procedure can ever represent investors’ percep- 
tions perfectly, and each of the three procedures used here may go astray 
in some way that matters importantly for the consequent results. 
21. The magnitudes reported here are larger than those found by Frankel (forthcoming)  in 
a study that in some respects parallels the work described here. One source of this difference 
is that Frankel assumed a risk aversion value of two, instead of four as assumed here. An- 
other is that Frankel included tangible assets in household  wealth (while still excluding  all lia- 
bilities), instead of focusing only on financial assets as here. 88  Beniamin M. Friedman 
The second caveat, also noted in the discussion above, is that the analy- 
sis in this paper focuses only on the financing effects associated with gov- 
ernment deficits. The deficit is just the difference between government ex- 
penditures and tax revenues, however, and each has effects on nonfinancial 
economic activity. When the economy’s resources are less then fully em- 
ployed, greater expenditures and/or lower taxes stimulate real spending, 
incomes, and output. At full employment the chief result is inflation. In 
either case the associated nonfinancial effects of government deficits typi- 
cally create indirect financial pressures that interact with the direct financ- 
ing effects studied here. 
The third caveat is that the analysis in this paper focuses only on finan- 
cial assets and, since some 90% of all borrowing by US.  households takes 
place to  finance purchases of nonfinancial assets, ignores households’ lia- 
bilities. Not taking household liabilities into account is probably not a 
major concern in the context of this paper’s focus (it could be in other 
contexts), but the omission of nonfinancial assets potentially is. Whether 
two assets are close or distant substitutes can depend importantly on  what 
other assets are also in the investor’s portfolio,  or at least available for 
purchase. Moreover, nonfinancial assets bulk large in households’ aggre- 
gate portfolio. As of year-end  1980, U.S. households owned $2.8 trillion 
of residential real estate and $1 .O trillion of consumer durables-together 
more than the $3.5 trillion of financial assets shown in table 4.1. Including 
these nonfinancial assets and their returns in an analysis like that under- 
taken here is an important subject for further research. 
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